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As web services have become business critical components, it is very vital
to improve their security. Many businesses define penetration testing as the
web vulnerabilities scanners automatically operate the site, however, the true
penetration testing is more than that. It needs sophistic skills and experience
of the testers.
Web vulnerability scanners can detect weaknesses in a black-box way, and
they are easy to use. There are various scanners to choose; organizations
should select them based on their requirements and conditions. In this thesis,
we study vulnerabilities in one web application named Virtual Environment
Manager (VEM) of Tieto company. After scanning VEM with two scanners,
11 types of vulnerabilities are detected. Then, we exploit every vulnerability
based on the application’s source code, and also evaluate their severity levels.
Finally, the solutions of remedying these vulnerabilities are provided. Because
of some limitations, the security testing of the VEM is not fully implemented.
For example, the cloud infrastructure is not detected. Still, this experiment
contributes to security testing of VEM web application. We hope that this
project can help Tieto company improve the security level of VEM.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Security testing is important in today’s software development. The thesis stud-
ies vulnerabilities of a web application from a Finland Company. The author
used web scanners to implement security testing during the experiment. 11
kinds of vulnerabilities were detected after scanning, then, each specific type is
analyzed and evaluated in detail. The risk-based approaches were used when
analyzing the web weaknesses: considering both the system architectural im-
plementation and the attackers’ mindset. The results show which types of
vulnerabilities are most serious; which types are less serious; which types are
the false positive. The methodology of vulnerability exploit is presented in the
thesis as well. What is more, this thesis provides the solutions of these vulner-
abilities. We hope the work can help Tieto improve VEM’s security level, and
also help testers with their exploitation.
1.1 Problem statement
The World Wide Web has changed our world, and it is the focus of 21st econ-
omy. At the same time, numerous web sites have suffered from various risks
and attacks. In the history, sites belonging to Yahoo, CNN, Amazon, and oth-
ers were attacked and had to be shut down for hours. The website’s owners
cost much for this action, for instance, Yahoo claimed it lost more than a mil-
lion dollars per minute in advertising revenue during the attack. [12] What is
more, an article published in ZD-Net claims that 30% to 40% of e-commerce
sites throughout the Internet are vulnerable to one simple attack: the attacks
only practice saving HTML page to disk, modifying the price and reloading the
page in a browser to decrease the goods price. Attacks on the Internet are not
only limited to e-commerce sites. A significant number of high-profile websites
had to rewrite their pages due to attacks, which include the U.S. Department
of Justice, the U.S. Air Force, UNICEF, and the New York Times. [12] Since
Web services are often deployed with software bugs that can be maliciously
exploited, security testing is critical during software development process.
Although it is impossible to achieve zero vulnerabilities in web applications,
the number can be decreased through security testing. White-box and black-
box methods are both used in software security testing, and they use different
approaches depending on whether the tester has access to source code. The
white-box method is very useful in finding programming errors; however, it
sometimes reports weaknesses that do not exist. Black-box testing can run a
program without knowing the source code, while the effectiveness is lower than
1
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white-box testing. Since both approaches are with advantages and drawbacks,
it is wise to combine them in security testing practice.
A simple way to test applications against security weaknesses is to use web
vulnerability scanners. They provide an automatic way to detect various types
of vulnerabilities avoiding the repetitive and tedious task of doing hundreds or
even thousands of manual tests. Most of these scanners are designed for com-
mercial use (e.g., IBM Rational AppScan and AppSpider), while there are also
some free application scanners (e.g., Zed Attack Proxy, W3af and Vega). They
offer remediation advice and generate vulnerability reports, based on which
testers can improve the application security level. Researchers have shown
that the effectiveness of scanners varies a lot during vulnerability detection.
[35] This thesis focuses on two web scanners, the Zed Attack Proxy and Burp
suite, and analyzes their scan result in detail. By scanning a real commercial
web application VEM of Tieto company, verifying these vulnerabilities, classi-
fying the severity, reporting and proving solutions, one completed web security
test process is presented. Besides, another goal of this thesis is to report the
results and improve the experimental website security.
1.2 Contribution
Testers should use risk-based approaches, considering both the system’s archi-
tectural reality and the attacker’s mindset, to enhance software security. After
identifying risks in a system, the tester can create test cases by focusing on
areas of code where an attack may succeed. This approach provides a higher
level of software security than black-box testing. Because security testing in-
volves two approaches, the testers need more expertise and experience than we
think. Standard testing organizations use the traditional approach to perform
functional security testing; however, they have more difficulty in performing
risk-based security test. Security testers may have difficulties to think like an
attacker because of lacking expertise, and they usually do not develop direct
security exploits.
In our project, we tried to think from both the application’s architecture
and the attacker’s perspective to security test VEM. First, we could access the
application source code as a developer. Second, we implemented exploits to
the detected vulnerabilities.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 gives the background of
the thesis, then chapter 3 presents vulnerability testing tools and methodology.
Next, the case study of the experiment on Tieto application is shown in chap-
ter 4. We analyze the scanning reports and give practical remediation advice
in chapter 5. The evaluation and measurement of the whole work are presented
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in chapter 6. Finally, chapter 7 concludes and summarizes the thesis.
Chapter 2
Web application security vulner-
abilities testing
This chapter gives an overview of the web applications and vulnerabilities in
them. The main idea is how the applications have been developed, and how is
the situation of vulnerabilities.
2.1 Web application
We describe how the web application is developed in this section. In the begin-
ning, there are some other ways to transmit information such as FTP protocol.
However, the World Wide Web is outstanding because of its excellent design.
Also, the section will discuss the basic ideas of web application testing.
2.1.1 History and architecture
The success of the Internet and the Web should be attributed to a combination
of market need, determinism, and consumerism. [12] Due to powerful desktop
computers, reasonably fast modems, sophisticated computer users, the Web
became wildly popular in the mid-1990s and gained mass increase. It is also to
claim that the web was pushed by companies including IBM, Cisco, etc. They
made lots of efforts to convince business leaders to became involved in online
business models. After that, the success of a large number of Internet startups
such as Amazon, Yahoo, and VeriSign promoted the web to create an online
business climate in the world. However, the Internet was just one of many large-
scale computer networks deployed in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, and it was never
considered "the most likely to succeed network". For example, IBM and HP
spent hundreds of millions of dollars developing a network product called Open
System Interconnection (OSI); OSI was mandated by the U.S. government,
which regarded the Internet and TCP/IP as a transitional step. [12] The
writer of book "Web Security, Privacy & Commerce" contributes the success of
Internet and Web largely to their design, which was technically superior to its
competitors, open to developers and easy for customers to use.
To provide physicists with a convenient way to publish their papers on
the Internet, the World Wide Web was invented in 1990 by Tim Berners-Lee.
Though there were other ways of transmitting information over the Internet and
accessing remote databases at that time, for example, the FTP protocol, the
World Wide Web is outstanding. It had two genius ideas. One is that the World
4
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Wide Web has a single addressing scheme, which is critical for successful large
scale communication systems. Considering the telephone system, it includes the
country code, city code, and then phone number. Another example is the postal
system; it finds the target based on the person’s name, street address, city, state
and postal code. Instead, the addressing solution in the World Wide Wed is
called URL, composed of a protocol (HTTP), the host name, followed by the
resource name. Another great insight of Berners-Lee was that he realized that
the Internet addresses could be embedded within other resources [8]. Thus, one
document on the Internet could contain links to other documents. Guided by
this idea, Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) was also invented, borrowing
its syntax from an earlier markup language, SGML. What is more, Berners-
Lee created two software programs: a web server and a browser, to prove his
ideas. After that, to make this technology commercial, browsers named Mozilla,
Netscape Navigator were pushed in the business market.
The modern Web architecture addresses scalability among component inter-
actions, independence of components, generality of interfaces, communication
latency, security, and encapsulating legacy systems. With these characteristics,
it is one instance of an REST-style architecture. REST is a type of structure
that attempts to minimize latency in network communication while maximizing
the scalability and independence of component implementations. [11] Through
placing constraints on connector semantics, REST achieved its goals. It enables
reuse and caching of communications, dynamic substitutability of components,
and processing of actions by intermediaries to become an Internet-scale dis-
tributed hypermedia system. The primary focus of Web-based application
protocols and performance concerns is distributed hypermedia, even though
it allows other styles of interaction.
2.1.2 Development and test
The vast spread of Internet has produced a significant growth in the demand for
web applications, which are required to have properties of reliability, usability,
and security. Due to these strict requirements from market pressure as well
as short time to market, the web application testing has become a challenging
work in the software development process. Usually, a web application with
a client-server or multi-tier architecture mainly includes the following three
characteristics:
– A significant number of users distributed all over the world who can access
it concurrently.
– Heterogeneous execution environments consist of multiple types of hard-
ware and software (e.g., many different operating systems, web servers,
web browsers and network connections).
– Heterogeneous nature that depends on the various of software components
it usually includes [8]. For example, these components can be constructed
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with different programming languages and models.
Each of the list described above produces a new testing challenge and per-
spective. For instance, practical solutions for verifying the web application
behavior when a large number of users access it at the same time should be
looked for. Another critical feature of a web application is its security and abil-
ity to prevent unauthorized accesses. Moreover, the different technologies used
to implement the web applications will increase the cost of creating the testing
environment and the testing complexity. Since the main aim of the testing of a
web application is to discover failures in the required services and functionality,
the testing can be classified as functional and non-functional testing.
The responsibility of functional testing is to find the failures of applications
when implementing specified technical requirements. One point that needs to
be paid attention to is that testers should avoid observing failures are due to
the running environment, or reduce them to the minimum [8], because the
running environment mainly affects the non-functional requirements of appli-
cations. When referring to non-functional testing of a web application, it is
required to satisfy requirements including portability, performance, scalability,
compatibility, accessibility, usability, and security.
The aim of security testing is to guarantee the overall Web system defenses
against access by unauthorized users, to prevent system resources from going
to improper uses, and to grant the access of authorized users to authorized re-
sources and services. Testers must use risk-based approaches, considering both
the system’s architectural implementation and the attacker’s mindset, to test
Web application adequately [30]. System security vulnerabilities may be con-
tained in the application code, in different hardware, software, and middleware
components of the system. Both the application and its running environment
can trigger the security problems. In a Web application, various implementa-
tion and execution technologies, as well as a very vast number of users, and the
possibility of accessing from anywhere make the Web application more vulnera-
ble than traditional ones, and security testing is also harder to perform [8]. The
focus of this thesis is on web application security testing. Security vulnerability
analysis tools, methodology, and the process will be discussed in detail. More-
over, there will be a vulnerability testing experiment of one practical software
from Tieto company presented in chapter 4.
2.2 Web Vulnerabilities
We will give an overview of web vulnerabilities: the types and the growth of
them.
2.2.1 Definition
A vulnerability is a weakness or a hole in an application, that allows attacks
to cause harm to the owner of the application. There are some examples of
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vulnerabilities:
– lack of input validation on user input
– lack of sufficient logging mechanism
– fail-open error handling
– not closing connections properly
Typically, vulnerabilities fall into two categories: bugs at the implementation
level and flaws in the design level [20]. When hackers attack the application,
they do not care if a vulnerability is a flaw or a bug. As attackers are becoming
more sophisticated, and the notion of which types of vulnerabilities matter is
changing. For instance, a race condition was considered exotic a few years ago,
although they are common today. Similarly, two-stage buffer-overflow attacks
were the domain of software scientists, while now they appear in zero-day
exploits. [30]
2.2.2 Distribution of various vulnerabilities
The German company SAP, the market leader in enterprise application soft-
ware, published a global survey in 2013. It described vulnerabilities in their
products sorted by their frequency, criticality and the affected system from
2001 to 2013 [33]. Every month on SAP Critical Patch Day, one or more SAP
Security Notes were released. In figure 2.1, the number of the notes was rarely
small from 2001 to 2007. In 2007, the number of published notes began to
Figure 2.1: Published SAP Security Notes from 2001 to 2013
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grow exponentially. The figure also shows that the number of security notes
had decreased a little since the peak in 2010; however, the number is still huge.
Moreover, most of the security notes (69%) were considered to have high pri-
ority when sorted by criticality according to the statistical survey. This means
that about 2/3 of the published vulnerabilities must be remedied as soon as
possible. SAP Security Notes were also analyzed by their frequency, and the
most common types of vulnerabilities presented in figure 2.2. The survey of
SAP is representative in business application issues, while the OWASP Top 10
2013 covered all web-based applications. OWASP is a non-profit organization
that provides unbiased, practical, cost-effective information about application
security. The comparison between these two reports is presented in table 2.1,
and the situation here changed slightly. After considering the data, it is rea-
sonable to gain four conclusions [33]:
1. Growing number of discovered XSS vulnerabilities is predictable due to
the growing popularity of web-based applications, and also because of the
higher level of static code analysis.
2. The number of directory traversal issues would fall because they were
easy to find, and most of them had already been found before.
3. The number of code injection vulnerabilities would grow because of the
high criticality and the fact that any injection flaws would be easier to
find with the improvement of static code analysis tools.
4. Moreover, such issues as hardcoded credentials would be harder to find
with every year precisely because they are very easy to find.
Vulnerability type Ranking in SAP
in mid 2013
Growth by per-
cent (from mid
2011 to mid
2013)
Place in
OWASP
TOP 10
XSS 1 53% 3
Missing authorization check 2 28% 7
Directory traversal 3 10% 4
SQL Injection 4 5% 1
Information disclosure 5 36% 6
Code injection 6 57% 1
Authentication bypass 7 18% 2
Hardcoded credentials 8 17% 2
Remote code execution 9 13% 1
Verb tampering 10 11% 7
Table 2.1: Differences between SAP top 10 security notes and OWASP Top 10
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Figure 2.2: 10 types of vulnerabilities
Except for the listed vulnerabilities, there are hundreds of issues that could
affect the overall security of a web application [21]. OWASP suggests web
developers to read its security guides [22, 23] before writing the code. It also
provides related guidance [24] on testing web vulnerabilities effectively. As the
Top 10 may change regularly, and other new vulnerabilities may come instead
of the current common ones, application developers should pay more attention
to their design and implementation phases. They should always keep following
the latest security information, and wisely use tools to ensure their application
works in a secure way.
Chapter 3
Vulnerability testing tools and meth-
ods
The attackers can attack one application through various paths. We describe
how to evaluate the risk of a particular vulnerability in this chapter, and give
the methodology for security testing.
3.1 Usage scenario
There are many different paths in an application that can be used by attackers
to do harm to a business or organization. As figure 3.1 shows, each of these
paths represents a risk that may be severe enough to warrant attention. These
paths are difficult to find and exploit, sometimes, while they may be trivial
to find sometimes. Similarly, the harm caused by these paths may ruin the
business or have no consequences at all. Thus, testers should evaluate the
severity of consequences with each threat agent, attack vector, security weak-
ness and combine it with an estimate of the technical and business impact of
the organization [21]. After all, all of them together determine the overall risk.
Figure 3.1: Different paths to harm the businesses in an application
Depending on whether the tester has access to the source code, the software
test method can be classified as white and black-box testing. It is very effective
to find the programming errors when involving white-box testing, due to the
requirement of understanding the code and design. For example, risk analysis
is a white-box approach depending on a good understanding of the system. On
the other hand, black-box testing refers to analyzing the application by probing
it with various inputs. This approach is relatively straightforward without
10
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accessing the code. One case of black-box testing is the use of web scanners
to find the application vulnerabilities. In some cases, these two approaches are
combined: using the black-box testing to probe the weaknesses; then the white-
box one is used to navigate the source code to verify or remedy the application.
We use the combination of white and black-box testing in our experiment in
this thesis.
Black-box web application vulnerability scanners are automated tools to
probe the Web application for vulnerabilities. Except that, they also offer
remediation advice and generate compliance reports. There are intrinsic limi-
tations to these scanners, and they have the false positives to some extent. For
instance, scanners may state the vulnerabilities that do not exist in one appli-
cation. However, they provide a cost-effective method to probe some significant
weaknesses in a request by mimicking the attackers and may configure and test
defenses such as web application firewalls [5]. A large number of web scanners
exist. Some of them are produced to make a profit by business owners (e.g.,
Rational AppScan of IBM, AppSpider), while some of them are open source
for non-profit use (e.g., Vege, WebInspect of HP).
3.2 Methodology
Our study steps and method are outlined now. Firstly, the principles of vul-
nerability scanners are explained. Then, we describe how we set the web vul-
nerability scanners to maximize the application scanning coverage. Finally, we
propose how to verify the severity of the vulnerabilities.
3.2.1 Principles of the web scanner
A Web application security scanner is an automated program that examines
web applications for potential security vulnerabilities. The basic functional
requirements for scanners used in evaluations of application layer software on
the web are listed below [6]:
– Define a minimum level of functionality for the purchaser and vendor to
qualify the product.
– Produce unambiguous clauses as to what is required to conform.
– Build consensus on tool functions and requirements toward the evaluation
of software security assessment tools for behavior and effectiveness.
The web scanners have capabilities far beyond those. Some scanners can
scan other artifacts such as requirements documents, bytecode or binary code;
some scanners are system security tools, e.g., firewalls, anti-virus software,
gateways, routers; some can check infrastructure vulnerabilities, deployment,
or configuration issues, such as running an obsolete version of a web server. In
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our experiment, we use the web scanners that can set characteristics such as
protocols and methods; they need authentication as well.
3.2.2 Web scanners setting
The URL of the web applications needs to be entered as well as an individual
user’s login credentials to start a scan session in a scanner. Then, the tester
must specify options for the scanner page crawler to maximize page scanning
coverage. Through setting the "crawl-only" mode, we can verify the provided
login and whether the crawler options work well as expected. After setting
the crawler, the scanning profile, or test vector set was specified by the tester,
which was used in the vulnerability detection run. This step happened before
launching the scan. Finally, it was time to start scan process. Every scanner
can proceed automatically with the scanning profile selection and most allows
interactive modes in which the tester may direct the scanner to scan each
page [5]. In the study of this thesis, the scanners were always set to run with
automatic mode, to maximize the vulnerability detection capability under the
most comprehensive available test setting. Moreover, we improve the detection
results by scanning the target application multiple times because some of the
tests are randomized.
3.2.3 Vulnerability evaluation and verification
The standard risk model referencing from OWASP [25] can be listed as follows:
Risk = Likelihood ∗ Impact (3.1)
The first step is to estimate the "likelihood" to determine how serious the risk
is. This is a rough measure of how likely each vulnerability is to be exploited
by attackers. The final goal is to identify if the likelihood is low, medium, or
high. The factors and their points that are helpful in determining the risk are
listed:
– Ease of discovery (1,3,7,9): is it easy for threat agents to discover the
vulnerability?
– Ease of exploiting (1,3,5,9): how easy for attackers actually to exploit
this vulnerability?
– Awareness (1,4,6,9): how familiar attackers with this vulnerability, and
is it known to the public or a new one?
– Skill level (1,3,5,6,9): the security penetration skill, network and pro-
gramming skill, and no technical skill of threat agents.
– Motivation (1,4,9): how motivated is the attacker to find and exploit this
vulnerability?
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– Opportunity (0,4,7,9): how easy the attack can access the application,
are they internal users, developers?
– Threat agent size (2,4,5,6,9): how large is the threat agents? Developers,
users, system administrators, and so on.
When considering the impact of an attack, both "technical impact" and
"business impact" work. The "technical impact" involves data, and functions
provided by the application. The "business impact" is more important because
it may directly influence the profit or fame of a company. Technical impact
factors include:
– Loss of confidentiality (2,6,7,9): how much data would be disclosed and
how sensitive is it?
– Loss of integrity (1,3,5,7,9): how much data would be disrupted and the
damage of it?
– Loss of availability (1,5,7,9): how much service would be lost and is it
vital?
– Loss of accountability (1,7,9): Are the attackers traceable?
The business impact factors list below:
– Financial damage (1,3,7,9): how much damage from an exploit and the
cost to fix it?
– Reputation damage (1,4,5,9): could the exploit harm the reputation of
the company?
– Privacy violation (3,5,7,9): how much individual private information
would be disclosed?
The next step to determine the severity of the risk is to estimate the points
(taking the median number) of "Likelihood" and "Impact" according to the
listed items. The number of points refers the different levels of them, and
the relationship is presented in Table 3.1. Finally, the severity level can be
gained through Table 3.2. For example, when the likelihood is medium, and
the impact is high, the overall severity level is high. The last step is to fix these
risks, according to their priority, and the most severe risks should be fixed first.
However, not all risks are worth fixing, and the cost should be considered when
deciding to repair risks issues. In chapter 5, we will have a detailed analysis of
these vulnerabilities, and give the solutions as well.
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Likelihood and Impact Levels
0 to <3 LOW
3 to <6 MEDIUM
6 to 9 HIGH
Table 3.1: Relationships between points and levels
Overall Risk Severity
Impact
HIGH Medium High Critical
MEDIUM Low Medium High
LOW Note Low Medium
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
Likelihood
Table 3.2: Likelihood and Impact levels
Chapter 4
Case study
We post our security test methodology of the Web application in chapter 3.
In this chapter, a case study of a security testing is presented. VEM (virtual
environment manager) in Finnish company Tieto was regarded as the target
application to conduct the security test. Zap and Burp Suite were utilized as
tools to scan the VEM, and they generated eleven types of security vulnerabil-
ities finally.
4.1 Test system architecture
Figure 4.1 is the architecture of test system in our experiment. The two main
components are code manager (GitHub) and issue manager (Jira) [4]. The test
script and tools are used to probe the application code; then, the results are
posted into Jira to be tracked. The results can show which vulnerabilities need
to be fixed, and the code is modified after tracking the issues. After that, the
code is checked and fixed in the next round of the test.
Figure 4.1: Test system architecture of VEM
4.2 Test tools
Table 4.1 lists the tools applied in this thesis. Burp Suite has two versions, free
and commercial version. In this thesis, the test was carried with commercial
one, due to the writer doing the experiment during work in Tieto company.
Considering the limited experimental conditions, the author decided to use
15
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ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy) as another tool to probe the target application vul-
nerabilities. This choice was made due to its fitness for the Linux experimental
platform, being very simple to use and having the capability of finding a wide
range of web application vulnerabilities.
Owners Tools Version
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy 2.5.0
PortSwigger Burp Suite 1.7.16
Table 4.1: Used web vulnerability scanners
4.3 Test target
We use VEM (Virtual Environment Manager) as our experimental target. It
is a tool that helps clients to create their test environment on Tieto’s private
OpenStack cloud. VEM allows users creating virtual instances on it, like op-
erating on the OpenStack dashboard. Simultaneously, users can also view and
manage their instances when logging into OpenStack account on Tieto’s cloud.
Comparing with the OpenStack, VEM has two obvious advantages:
– It helps create instances conveniently by setting the properties of in-
stances (e.g., IP, network) automatically. Otherwise, users may spend
some time to type these properties when creating the instances.
– It also helps remove instances from OpenStack quickly.
The aim of VEM is to improve the effectiveness when using the OpenStack.
The VEM refers to a wide range of technologies, which include HTML/CSS/-
JavaScript, Docker, python, Kafka and so on.
4.4 Test results
The detailed threat test profile information of two scanners (ZAP, Burp Suite)
was obtained after using the tools, and Figures 4.2 concludes the result. It
plots 11 types of vulnerabilities were found by our scanners: some of them
are detected by both scanners, while some of them are only detected by one
scanner. It is also necessary to rank these risks to repair the application bugs,
due to the limitation on development time. Figure 4.3 presents the percentage
of each severity level.
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Figure 4.2: Average ratio of each vulnerability
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Figure 4.3: Severity level percentage
Chapter 5
Detailed analysis of the vulnera-
bilities
In the chapter 4, we have presented our experiment environment, including
target system, and scanning tools. Figure 5.1, 5.2 are snapshots of scan results.
In this chapter, we will discuss the details of the vulnerabilities. The analysis
of each vulnerability consists of four parts: description, exploitation, severity
evaluation and solution.
Figure 5.1: Burp scanner results
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Figure 5.2: Zap scanner results
5.1 SSL cookie without secure flag set
Description: If a cookie is set with security flag, browsers will not send it in any
requests that use HTTP connection. Therefore, setting the secure flag prevents
the cookie from being intercepted by an attacker monitoring network traffic.
Exploitation: Authentication is required for communication between web server
and its client. A client usually authenticates web server through SSL/TLS and
a certificate, while there are three general ways for the server to verify who the
client is. These techniques include cookies, hidden forms, and encrypted URL
[36]. When a cookie is used as the authentication token, anyone can access
user session when it is gained. If the secure flag is not set during a cookie’s
transmission, it will allow being transmitted over an insecure connection, for
instance, public Wi-Fi or another network shared with a comprised computer.
As a result, attackers can eavesdrop on the victim’s network traffic and stolen
the cookie. In the next, the attacker is entitled to access all user’s information,
which can cause a serious consequence. In a form-based authentication, the
following similar codes will appear:
<form method=’POST’ action=’https://www.example.com’>
<input type=’hidden’....>
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</form>
Furthermore, corresponding configuration is needed in server [17]. For in-
stance,
<login-config>
<auth-method> FORM</auth-method>
............
</login-config>
The encrypted URL authentication method is used in a situation such as
SSL/TLS transmission. Three keys play essential roles in whole phases, which
are the public key, private key and session key. This infrastructure will be
further introduced later in the thesis. HTTP [9] is a stateless protocol that
uses a mechanism such as a cookie to keep track of the state of a transaction
[31]. Simultaneously, a cookie can be used as a session key during HTTPS
(HTTP Secure) transaction. The VEM is an example that a cookie contains
session key. According to OWASP [28], browsers’ extension tools, e.g. Chrome
Extension Cookie Editor, Firefox Cookie Editor, are helpful in determining if
a cookie is an authentication token in a web application. After testing with
Chrome Extension Cookie Editor, we found that VEM is not built with this
mechanism while based on encrypted URL transmission. The client request
and server response were tracked in Burp to prove cookie’s usage, and they
are listed in table 5.1. The table presents that cookie value is maintained the
same after SSL connection established. Therefore, it is a session key. When
considering this situation, the risk is lower than expected if the cookie is exposed
to attackers.
Severity level: Low
Solution: Each cookie has five attributes, that are secure, HttpOnly, domain,
path, and expires. A secure tag informs the browser that the cookie can only be
sent over a secure channel such as HTTPS. HttpOnly tag disallows the cookie
to be accessed via a client-side script such as JavaScript. The domain is used
to compare against server domain with requested client domain, and only hosts
within the specified domain are allowed to set a cookie for that domain. The
path attribute is supplemented domain, and expires to set persistent cookies,
within which the cookie will not expire. [28] All the attributes can be set
in configuration files on servers. Application developers should pay particular
attention to cookie attributes to fulfill their requirements.
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URL Request Response
step1 https://10.
37.11.59/
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.37.11.59 ...
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx ...
set-cookie:connect.sid=s%
3AteH9DFvQtLL7n
MabLQttu7li2o27R
Ixl.M710HYAB65DQOUG
ZYbWP5XW6%2FTK0%2
BLFHrD7X30uRcOU;
Path=/;HttpOnly
step2 https://10.
37.11.59
/login
GET /login HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.37.11.59...
Cookie: connect.sid=s%
3AteH9DFvQtLL7n
MabLQttu7li2o27R
Ixl.M710HYAB65DQOUG
ZYbWP5XW6%2FTK0%2
BLFHrD7X30uRcOU;
Path=/;HttpOnly
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
...
step3 https://10.
37.11.59
/login
POST /login HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.37.11.59...
Cookie: connect.sid=s%
3Av0Pw4YBxAL9rVMMR
pIQDWdLzVJ1KSfJc.nBW
3FMiGN8HTSBGuAESezPq
JKK9FQGSq3Xru3VOOSOU
HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Tem-
porarily
Server: nginx
...
step4 https://10.
37.11.59/vec
/workspace
GET /vec/workspace
HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.37.11.59...
Cookie: connect.sid=s%
3Av0Pw4YBxAL9rVMMR
pIQDWdLzVJ1KSfJc.nBW
3FMiGN8HTSBGuAESezPq
JKK9FQGSq3Xru3VOOSOU
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
...
step5 https://10.
37.11.59
/logout
GET /logout HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.37.11.59...
Cookie: connect.sid=s%
3Av0Pw4YBxAL9rVMMR
pIQDWdLzVJ1KSfJc.nBW
3FMiGN8HTSBGuAESezPq
JKK9FQGSq3Xru3VOOSOU
HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Tem-
porarily
Server: nginx
...
Table 5.1: Cookie value changes in transaction
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5.2 SSL certificate
Description: SSL/TLS establishes a secure channel between server and client.
To be authenticated by its client, the server must provide an SSL certificate
that holds its hostname, issued by a trusted authority in a valid time. Only
meet both requirements, can the transmission be fully protected by SSL/TLS.
VEM uses a self-signed certificate, which generates alarms from browsers. The
alerts describe that the server’s certificate is not valid for the server’s hostname
and the server’s certificate is not trusted.
Exploitation: SSL certificates are data files that bind a cryptographic key to
an organization’s details [13], which include:
– A domain name, server name or hostname.
– An organizational identity and location.
When installing on a web server, the SSL certificate activates the HTTPS pro-
tocol and allows secure connections between a web server and a browser. The
SSL is initially used for secure credit card transactions, data transfer and logins,
and is also becoming popular when securing browsing of social media sites. An
organization needs to install the SSL certificate onto its server to establish a
secure connection from a web server to a browser. An SSL certificate works
based on public key cryptography. The public key of the server is exposed, and
the browser sends the message encrypted with this public key. Only the pri-
vate key of the server can decrypt the message. A trusted Certificate Authority
issues a legal SSL certificate, and browsers, operating systems, mobile devices
maintain lists of trusted CA root certificates. To be trusted, the certificate
must present its root certificate on the end user’s machine. Otherwise, the
browser will display an untrusted error message to end user. In some cases, for
instance, e-commerce website, such error message indicates lacking confidence
of the site and organization and can make losing of trust and business from
most consumers. One well known, trusted Certificate Authority is GlobalSign,
since operating system and browser vendors such as Microsoft, Mozilla, Opera,
etc., believe that it is a legitimate CA and can be relied on to issue trustworthy
SSL certificates.
VEM did not issue its Certificate to a trustworthy Certificate Authority. It
used a self-signed certificate to authenticate to end users. At this stage, VEM
is mainly for internal usage, which means users know this website is trustful.
Thus, the severity level is low. However, as the VEM is open to more external
users, its certificate must be issued by a Certificate Authority to gain users’
confidence.
Severity level: Low
Solution: Two ways listed below can solve the problem:
1. Issue VEM’s certificate to a trusted Certificate Authority.
2. Distribute self-signed certificate to all users.
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There is a way to make a self-signed certificate secure and no need to pay
to Certificate Authorities. An organization could first securely distribute it to
all users who will connect to its website through SSL to ensure the self-signed
certificate is not vulnerable to forgery. In other words, transmit a copy of the
license to guarantee anyone can not disrupt it. This may involve posting the
certificate on a secure file-sharing site or giving website users a physical copy
using a disk. Then, the recipient of the license must install it in their browser as
a Certificate Authority before connecting to the organization’s website. Finally,
the browser can connect to the target URL and verify the authenticity of the
certificate. This free self-signed certificate is as secure as the paid one. However,
it needs to know the website users first, then gains their agreement. If Tieto
does not want to spend money on VEM certificate, it can distribute self-signed
one to its users. Users install certificate in their browsers as a “Certificate
Authority” before connecting with VEM. This way also guarantees the secure
communication between VEM server and clients.
5.3 Strict transport security not enforced
Description: The application fails to prevent from connecting to it over un-
encrypted connections. An attack able to modify a legitimate user’s network
traffic could bypass the application’s use of SSL/TLS encryption, and use the
application as a platform for attacks against its users. This attack is per-
formed by rewriting HTTPS links as HTTP so that if a targeted user follows
a link to the site from an HTTP page, their browser never attempts to use an
unencrypted connection.
Exploitation: If a connection through HTTP and redirects to HTTPS is allowed
by a website, the user may initially talk to the non-encrypted version of the
site before being redirected in this situation. For instance, the user types
http://www.example.com or just example.com. This provides a potential of a
man-in-the-middle attack, where the redirect could be exploited to direct the
user to a malicious site instead of the secure version of the original page [7].
Figure 5.3 shows such a case: middleware attack leads browser to connect to a
proxy, rather than directly to the server. The proxy uses SSL connect to the
server and get resources to the user, while the user uses HTTP connection with
it. The fake HTTP site gains user’s secret, and tools such as sslstripe [18] can
be used as such proxy. HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) is a solution
for this problem. By using HSTS, the browser will know to automatically use
only HTTPS, which prevents hackers from performing a man-in-the-middle-
attack. The first time one site is accessed using HTTPS, and it return the
Strict-Transport-Security header, then the browser records this information so
that it will automatically use HTTPS instead when the site is loading using
HTTP in the future.
However, when the duration time specified by the Strict-Transport-Security
header expires, the next attempt to load the site via HTTP will proceed as
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Figure 5.3: A man-in-the-middle attack scenario
usual without using HTTPS. Whenever the Strict-Transport-Security header
is delivered to the browser, the expiration time for that site will be updated.
The expiration time parameter can also be set to meet different requirements.
Excepting for setting Strict-Transport-Security, another way is to use SSL/TLS
connection to redirect to HTTPS automatically. VEM also utilizes this mech-
anism, so that HSTS is not a critical parameter. Due to the initial request in
SSL/TLS connection is sent with a unencrypted way, there is still a possibil-
ity to suffer from a man-in-the-middle attack. HSTS can prevent this sort of
attack entirely.
Severity level: Low
Solution: Enabling "strict transport security" feature in HTTP header by con-
figuring VEM web server:
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=expireTime [; includeSubDomains] [; preload]
The parameter "includeSubDomains" is optional, and it applies to all of the
site’s subdomains as well. Google maintains a "preload" service. Browsers will
never connect domains using an insecure connection by following this guideline.
5.4 X-Frame-Options header not set
Description: "X-Frame-Options" is not included in the HTTP response to pro-
tect against "Clickjacking" attacks. Clickjacking is a malicious technique that
involves deceiving a web user into interacting with another different website,
and the user has no awareness. This technique can be combined with other
attacks to cause severe impact such as sending unauthorized commands or
revealing confidential information while the web user is interacting with seem-
ingly harmless pages. The victim is forced to perform undesired actions (e.g.,
clicking a button that appears to activate another operation) by using specific
features of HTML and javascript in a clickjacking attack.
Exploitation: OWASP provides a method to test clickjacking attack of one web
application. Based on that, we found that the VEM is vulnerable and its pages
can be embedded into another website by using HTML tag <iframe></iframe>.
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Attackers may take advantage of this vulnerability to do something harmful.
In such a case, one user is opening a site to play some games when he is logging
into the VEM at the time. This game site can trick users with few buttons.
It seems that the user is clicking the buttons on the game pages. However,
this user is interacting with VEM’s page without any awareness. The mimic
interactions are shown in the Figures [5.4,5.5,5.6] below, and the opacity of the
malicious page can be set to zero to prevent the user from seeing the embedded
site.
Figure 5.4: VEM page is embedded into malicious game page with opacity
equals zero
Figure 5.5: Victim acts in game site also interacting with VEM
In Figure 5.4, VEM is embedded with a seemly game website. Due to the
HTML/CSS feature, the VEM page can be hidden and not seen by victims.
When the user is clicking a button on the game page, he/she is activating the
button in VEM page and enter an administration page in Figure 5.5. Figure
5.6 shows "Delete" button in VEM page is enabled while the user clicks "play"
on the game site, where the malicious action succeed. The two buttons were
connected with javascript functions related to "iframe" of the HTML page, and
the completed exploitation source code is attached in First appendix A.
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Figure 5.6: Victim click "play" button on game site and perform harm in VEM
without knowing
Severity level: High
Solution: There are two common approaches to defense clickjacking attack. Mi-
crosoft implemented the X-Frame-Options header that was sent from the server
on HTTP responses to mark web pages shouldn’t be framed. The header con-
tains values DENY, SAMEORIGIN, ALLOW-FROM origin, and non-standard
ALLOWALL. DEDY is recommended to protect a website from clickjacking.
Major browsers have adopted the X-Frame-Options header. However, it has
main three limitations that may cause a possibility of clickjacking exploitation:
1. The header is not compatible with the old browser, since introducing in
2009.
2. The header may be stripped by web proxies. As a result, the site loses
framing protection.
3. Though not every page of the site has implemented the header, the mobile
version of the website has not to be protected.
The most common defense is called frame busting, which prevents a site from
functioning when loaded inside a frame. [32] It consists of a script in the web
page that should not be framed. The important techniques refer to mobile
website version, double framing, disabling javascript, onBeforeUnload event,
XSS Filter and redefining location [27, 32].
5.5 Web browser XSS protection not enabled
Description: Web Browser XSS Protection is not enabled, or disabled by the
configuration of the ’X-XSS-Protection’ HTTP response header on the web
server.
Exploitation: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) are among the most common types
of attacks against the Web application. It involves echoing attacker’s code
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into a user’s browser or client via web pages viewed by the target users [15].
These codes are written in different static or dynamic contents such as HTML,
JavaScript, Active X, Flash or any other technology supported by the browser.
A successful XSS attack helps attackers to hijack user’s account via a cookie,
redirect a user to another website from the original one and to increase other
types of attacks such as phishing. Where the XSS causes significant risk is
in the browser that interacts closely with the file system on the end user’s
computers for loading content.
The most two common XSS prevention mechanisms are Filtering and Es-
caping [1]. XSS attack code could come from a simple <form> submitted by
website users, or could take a more complicated route such as a JSON script, or
XML web service. Filter XSS protection is to pass all external data through a
filter which will remove dangerous keywords, such as the infamous <SCRIPT>
tag, JavaScript commands, CSS styles and another dangerous HTML markup.
Developers can implement own filter mechanisms using existed libraries. When
using escaping, the browser is told effectively that the sending data should be
treated as data, rather than interpreted in any other way. An example list
escape codes of HTML is presented in Table 5.2.
Original characters After escaping
" &#34
# &#35
& &#38
( &#40
) &#41
; &#59
< &#60
> &#62
Table 5.2: List of escaped characters
If an attack manages to put a script on the target page, the victim will
not be affected because the browser will not execute the script if it is properly
escaped. Implementation filtering is more sophisticated than escaping. When
looking through the VEM codes, neither escaping nor filtering mechanism was
found. It seems that the possibility of XSS attack is relatively high.
Severity level: Middle
Solution: The header X-XSS-Protection enables XSS filter in browsers. By set-
ting different parameters, it can be enabled or disabled. The X-XSS-Protection
HTTP response header should be set to ’1’ to allow the filter [26]. One example
is:
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
Another way is to implement escape mechanism in VEM’s source code.
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5.6 X-Content-Type-Options header missing
Description: The Anti-MIME-Sniffing header X-Content-Type-Options was
not set to ’nosniff’. This allows older versions of Internet Explorer and Chrome
to perform MIME-sniffing on the response body, potentially interrupting the
body of reply and displaying as a content type other than the declared content
type. Current (early 2014) and legacy versions of Firefox will use the declared
content type (if one is set), rather than performing MIME-sniffing.
Exploitation: The MIME type is the mechanism to tell the client the variety
of the document transmitted: the extension of a file name has no meaning on
the web [19]. It is critical to correctly set up the server to ensure that each
document transmits the correct MIME type. Browsers often use the MIME-
type to determine what to do when fetching a resource. Table 5.3 is a list of
example MIME types.
Extension Type of document MIME Type
.aac AAC audio file audio/aac
.bin Any kind of binary data application/octet-stream
.bz BZip archive application/x-bzip
.css Cascading Style Sheets(CSS) text/css
.csv Comma-separated values(CSV) text/csv
.gif Graphics Interchange Format(GIF) image/gif
.js JavaScript application/javascript
.html/htm HyperText Markup Language(HTML) text/html
Table 5.3: List of MIME types
In the case that the MIME type absence, browsers may conduct MIME
sniffing to guess the exact MIME type by fetching the resource. The action is
performed differently in various browsers under different circumstances. How-
ever, there are some security concerns with this practice due to some MIME
types represent executable content and others not. MIME sniffing is a way
of attempting or deducing the file format or change the content. The files
uploaded by attacks could contain malicious contents or which is intentional
payloads, while these files seem benign when considering their content types
or Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (MIME) information. [34] There is
a list to quickly assess whether an application is vulnerable to MIME sniffing
attack:
1. The application allows uploads.
2. The application does no post-processing on the uploaded content.
3. The application is downloadable from the application.
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4. The content is not checked for MIME type mismatches.
MIME sniffing only exists on a website where users can upload files according
to content sniffing criteria, VEM is not satisfied. Thus, this type of attack is a
false positive.
Severity level: None
Solution: X-Content-Type-Options header was introduced Microsoft in IE8
[19] as a way to block content sniffing that could transform non-executable one
MIME type into another executable one. The server can block MIME sniffing
by sending the X-Content-Type-Options according to the Content-Type that
is used to indicate the media type of the resource. This header should be set
to avoid the vulnerability warnings:
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
5.7 Cross domain JavaScript source file include
Description: The page includes one or more script files from a third-party
domain.
Exploitation: Combining data and code from third-party sources have enabled
adding creativity and functionality to the Web application. However, this is
also involving new security challenges to the Web application. Current prac-
tices include giving uncontrolled cross-domain execution through the use of
<script> tags and extending the browsers with plugins to interaction cross
domains [14]. The former has a high potential security risk due to one site
gets complete control over another. External JavaScript files can harm website
aspects such as reading cookies, reading user input, changing what the user
sees, executing forms as the user, performing requests to other servers and so
on. External JavaScript files can only be included when developers trust the
domains involved will never harm them. If the external code is served by an
extensive CDN (e.g., Google’s CDN), the possibility is lower to be exploited.
The reason is that large companies have enough money to spend on security.
There are many various third-party JavaScript source files included in VEM’s
source code. Thus VEM is vulnerable to this type of attack.
Severity level: Low
Solution: Using static content from a CDN, or copying the third-party scripts
into VEM own domain and including them from there. If that is not possible,
for instance, some licensing reasons, then considering re-implement the scripts’
functionality within application code.
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5.8 Incomplete or no cache-control and pragma
HTTP header set
Description: The cache-control and pragma HTTP header have not been set
properly or are missing allowing the browser and proxies to cache content.
Exploitation: Web content caching can classify with basic caching and advanced
caching. The former one is the simplest caching options. A web page is stored
in a cache when it is rendered by the Web Content Manager application the
first time. Then, users can access this page from the cache until it expires.
The main advantage of basic caching is to improve the performance of the web
application, and should only be used for static content that does not require
"real-time" access. Five types of advanced caching are list below:
1. Site caching: Same as the basic web content cache except that cache
parameters in connect tags and URL requests can be used to override the
server’s default advanced web content caching settings.
2. Session caching: When it is enabled, a copy of each page the user visited
is stored in the session cache. The user accesses the cached version of a
webpage until they start a new session, or until it is expired.
3. User caching: The same as session cache except that the page is saved in
the user cache.
4. Secured caching: This is used on sites where the item security features are
used to grant different users access to different web pages and components
based on the groups they belong to.
5. Personalized caching: It is used to cache web pages of users who have the
same "personalization profile". This means that users who have selected
the same customization categories and keywords, and belong to the same
group, share a single cache.
There are two major differences between basic caching and advanced caching.
One is that advanced caching can cache pages based on different user profiles.
Another is that those cache parameters in connect tags and URL requests can
be used to override the server’s default advanced web content caching settings
making set individual web pages possible. In most cases, user, secured and per-
sonalized caching would mostly be used when using custom caching in connect
tags and URL requests. While basic, site and session caching would only be
used as the server’s default web content cache.
Applications such as Google, Facebook tend to keep user’s session always
alive. They use session caching. It appears that both Firefox and Chrome have
restored session cookies, for the convenience of their users, between browser
shut down and restart. However, this is insecure. Only persistent cookies
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should restore in this way. A typical example of the usage of persistent cookie
would check "keep me logged in" or "remember me" when logging into one site.
At the same time, websites such as a bank never cache anything. Depending
on the functionality of a website, it can choose whether using caching or not,
or use which type of caching. The cache-control head is not set in VEM, and
the following figure 5.7 is a cache page found in Firefox after user logout VEM.
Some sensitive information such as user’s ID, created workspace can be tracked.
It is possible for attackers to do some exploitation with this information. If
VEM does not need to keep user always online, it should disable the cache
functionality provided by the browser.
Figure 5.7: VEM cache page in Firefox
Severity level: Low
Solution: To prevent the individual user profile from being seen, VEM could
disable the cache feature. According to the definition of HTTP/1.1 [10], HTTP
header should be set with "Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store" and "Pragma:
no-cache" in VEM.
5.9 Email addresses disclosed
Description: One private email address was disclosed in the response.
Exploitation: Email addresses may appear intentionally with contact informa-
tion, and many applications include third-party email addresses within their
core content. However, email addresses of developers or other individuals may
disclose information that helps the attacker. Imagine an email address repre-
sents username that can be used to the application’s login, and it is possible to
be used in social engineering attacks against the organization’s personnel. The
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private email is used to receive feedback from users in VEM. Disclosing it may
increase the number of spam emails, but it is not a security vulnerability.
Severity level: None
Solution: Removing any email address that is unnecessary, or replacing it with
anonymous one such as helpdest@example.com. Furthermore, considering hide
the email address and instead with a form that generates the email server-side
to reduce the spam.
5.10 Private IP addresses disclosed
Description: The following RFC 1918 IP addresses were disclosed in the re-
sponse:
192.168.1.0
192.168.1.1
Exploitation: RFC 1918 specifies ranges of IP addresses that are used in pri-
vate networks and cannot be routed on the public Internet. An attacker can
determine the public IP addresses in use by an organization through various
ways. However, it is difficult to determine the private addresses. The web
vulnerability scanner alarmed "Disclosing the private addresses used within an
organization can help an attacker in carrying out network-layer attacks aiming
to penetrate the organization’s internal infrastructure". In this VEM case, it
is still very hard for attackers to perform evil events after having a glance of
private IP address.
Severity level: None
Solution: If the private addresses are being returned in service banners or debug
messages, this service should be configured to mask the private addresses. If
they are being used to track back-end servers for load balancing purpose, the
addresses should be rewritten with innocuous identifiers from which an attacker
disables to infer any useful information about the infrastructure. [29]
5.11 Password field with auto-complete enabled
Description: Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that
are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and
also by applications that employ user credentials. If the function is enabled,
then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and
retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.
Exploitation: Passwords saved in the browser can be accessed locally, which
means an attack can get victim’s user credentials. However, the browser will
usually ask users if they allow their passwords to be remembered or not. If
users share browser with others, they can choose not remember their passwords.
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When users use their private browser, automatic password filling is convenient
for them. Thus, this alarm should not be considered as a type of vulnerability.
Severity level: None
Solution: Do not allow the browser remember user’s password by hand.
Chapter 6
Discussion
This section will discuss the whole experiment: the summary of the evaluated
risks; the completeness and uncovered part of the experiment; the limitation
and future work.
6.1 Evaluation of the results
We conclude all the risks in this part. Some of them have higher severity level,
and need to be fixed in advance. The other security testing types in the VEM’s
system are also discussed here.
6.1.1 Risk analysis
In the last section, we have analyzed the security vulnerabilities in VEM of
Tieto. Based on methodology we proposed, table 6.1 presents the evaluation
results. We could conclude that VEM is vulnerable to "Click jacking" attack due
to lack of X-Frame-Options header or has not implemented the frame busting
technology. It has a relatively high possibility to suffer from XSS attack as well,
because VEM has no defense to this type of attack. Setting X-XSS-Protection
header can enable XSS filter, and escape mechanism iss also effective to prevent
the XSS attack. There are 5 types of vulnerabilities that have low severity
level, taking the largest part in classification groups by severity level. These
vulnerabilities are cookie without the secure flag, SSL certificate not issued
by a CA, strict transport security not enforced, cross domain JavaScript file
include, and no cache control set. Developers should follow the severity levels in
decreasing order when improving the application. We also found a false positive
detected by the two scanners. The "X-Content-Type-Options header not set"
report is harmless because the system does not need to upload files, which does
not meet the MIME attack requirements. Sensitive information such as email
addresses and private IP disclosure cannot be regarded as a type of security
vulnerability in this case. Also, the password automatic filling function cannot
be exploited, either.
We have reviewed the web application development process and weaknesses
in this thesis, especially web vulnerabilities. The vulnerability definition, de-
tection tools, verification and evaluation methodology are emphasized in it.
More importantly, one practical web application VEM (Virtual Environment
Manager) is used to do the experimental based on our security test method-
ology. After using scanner tools, 11 types of vulnerabilities were discovered.
Each of these was fully analyzed and evaluated by the author.
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Vulnerability Name Severity Level
SSL cookie without secure flag set Low
SSL certificate Low
Strict transport security not enforced Low
X-Frame-Options header not set High
Web browser XSS protection not enabled Medium
X-Content-Type-Options header missing None
Cross domain JavaScript source file include Low
Incomplete or no cache-control and pragma HTTP header set Low
Email addresses disclosed None
Private IP addresses disclosed None
Password field with auto-complete enabled None
Table 6.1: VEM security vulnerability distribution
6.1.2 Evaluation
Our work studied one web system and evaluated the severity level of vulnera-
bilities based in this application. Most existing research has studied web weak-
nesses from a statistical perspective and does not give the exploitation process.
For example, some papers covered a large number of websites and examined
various vulnerabilities without exploitation source code; some papers analyzed
the effectiveness of various scanners under different situations. However, our
project has two distinct advantages. One is that we have access to application
source code, which makes exploitation possible. Thus, the evaluation of the
weaknesses is more complete. For example, if the code does not contain XSS
defense, it is vulnerable to this attack. Another advantage is that the author is
both the inside developer and user of this application. In this case, the thesis
can dive into both the user’s and attacker’s mindsets to consider the attacks.
For instance, automatic password filling should not be considered a real vul-
nerability because it is a useful feature to the user. It also can be avoided if
they choose not remember the password when sharing devices or web accounts
with other users.
This thesis initially states the background of web vulnerability testing, then,
presents the tools and methodology for it. Based on the model, we implemented
our own web vulnerability testing project, and the OWASP TOP 10 2013 covers
most of the results. We hope that the test report can help Tieto improve
Virtual Environment Manager. The exploitation processes are beneficial to
later research as well.
Many current businesses define penetration testing as the application of
automated network vulnerability scanners to operate a site. However, the true
penetration testing is much more than that. [16] It depends on the skill and
experience of the tester. The VEM is a view for users to create their own virtual
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instances; the users and administrator of the system can manage their virtual
machines in an OpenStack environment. To implement the full penetration
testing for the VEM, there are still many test cases to consider. Some of them
are listed below:
1. No authentication in the client-server system. The VEM is designed for
particular users; however, it appears that any host who can access the
address can create virtual instances.
2. As the IaaS, VEM cannot guarantee that there is no security hole in the
virtual images it uses; no images signing for virtual machines.
3. The physical security of the infrastructure is extremely important in IaaS.
The hard in VEM should also be tested frequently such as preventing
damage from both natural and intentional way.
4. The paths by which the data is obtained or transmitted are also vulner-
able in a cloud environment, because the data will be transmitted from
source to destination through numerous third-party devices.
All in all, the completed test for the IaaS should consider storage, network,
backup and fault. [3]
6.1.3 Limitations
There exist a large number of web scanners ranging from commercial to open
source, and from Windows to Linux. This thesis just chooses ZAP and Burp
Suite for some specific reasons (e.g., test platform, tight budget), which may
cause the scan result to contain some bias. Different scanners may have various
reports, and they also have different ability to test certain types of vulnerabil-
ities. Thus, testers should try to use more scanners to detect web weakness.
When we exploit the application, we can only think from our perspectives.
While potential attackers are always more intelligent than developers, they
may have talent ways to attack the system. Thus, the evaluation result of
these vulnerabilities may be not stable.
6.2 Future work
When exploiting found vulnerabilities, the private IP address disclosure case is
not so fully understood. PortSwigger [29] states that this practice can help an
attack in carrying out network-layer attacks aiming to penetrate the organi-
zation’s internal infrastructure. Another source [2] shows that this alarm may
be a false positive. Due to lack of related knowledge, the author can’t exploit
this attack. However, the private IP must be seen by the system user, because
they are allowed to configure their private IP addresses. As considering all of
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this, this attack is regarded as a false positive and has no effect to the applica-
tion security. In the future, we have to improve the exploitation technology to
provide a more accurate assessment.
Though we used two different scanners in this project, each generated a
different report. It is reasonable to conclude that there are still some vulnera-
bilities that have not been found. Future work will also focus on the search for
more weaknesses to improve the VEM security level.
Chapter 7
Summary
Numerous websites have suffered from various attacks since e-commerce is sig-
nificant in our economic. If a risk happening on a great web organization such
as Amazon, Yahoo, they may lose millions of dollars even in a short time. There
have few such events occurred in recent years. Hackers can maliciously exploit
the majority of web applications with software bugs, and the Web vulnerabili-
ties exist in different types.
Though it is hard to prevent attacks or risks from happening, their num-
ber can be controlled by performing the security testing during applications
development. All organizations should implement security testing during their
application development, where vulnerability scanning is a good practice. Just
like in other tests, white-box and black-box testing are common in a security
testing. Web vulnerability scanner is a black-box way to detect weaknesses in
a system. They can identify vulnerabilities automatically after proper setting.
There exists a significant number of scanners range from commercial use to free
use, for instance, AppScan from IBM, WebInspect of HP, Vega from Subgraph
and so on. They can be potential tools to help organizations increase the se-
curity level of their applications. Except that, organizations such as OWASP
have summarized the most common vulnerabilities. OWASP also provides vul-
nerability exploiting methods and appropriate testing tool. The team needs to
identify which devices are suitable for them based on their situations, and the
purpose of the scanning, platform, cost, ease of use and the software support.
In this thesis, we presented a methodology to measure the severity of VEM
application from Tieto in chapter 3, and used two web scanners (ZAP and
Burp Suite) to check its weaknesses. They detect 11 types of vulnerability
in the system. After that, we verified, exploited every vulnerability carefully
from various perspectives, evaluated their severity levels, and gave the relative
solutions in chapter 5. We conclude five types of vulnerability have low severity
level; one with very high gravity; one with medium severity level and rest four
categories are the false positive. They are listing below:
1. High severity: X-Frame-Options header not set
2. Medium severity: Web browser XSS protection not enabled
3. Low severity: SSL cookie without secure flag set; SSL certificate; Strict
transport security not enforced; Cross domain JavaScript source file in-
clude; Incomplete or no cache-control and pragma HTTP header set
4. False positive: X-Content-Type-Options header missing; Email addresses
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disclosed; Private IP addresses disclosed; Password field with auto-complete
enabled
We have access to the source code of VEM so that it is possible to do ex-
ploitation. Some exploitations use the third-party tools (e.g., sslstrip to mimic
man-in-the-middle attack), and some need the tester to implement attack code.
It is also necessary to read a broad range of references when evaluating a vulner-
ability. During the whole experiment, the author has a glance of the principles
of common web vulnerabilities and how to detect, resolve them.
Due to a limited number of scanners, the exposed vulnerabilities were not so
fully, and the small bias may produce when evaluating severity level. Though
these limitations exist, this project still contributes to the VEM application
of Tieto. It helps development team to improve their product based on the
security awareness report. What is more, the later security testing can also
refer the detailed exploiting process described in the thesis.
In the future, we will continuously find the vulnerabilities in VEM to im-
prove its security level.
Appendix A
First appendix
Figure A.1: Clickjacking attack exploitation code(1)
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Figure A.2: Clickjacking attack exploitation code(2)
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